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Month: November 2023

The Case for Buying Rent-Stabilized Multi-Family Properties

I know, I know…buying multi-family properties comprised of mostly rent-stabilized units with nominal rental upside and increasing expenses in an elevated interest rate environment can’t possibly make any sense. However, I think it is time investors revisit the asset class and here’s why:

Purchasing Below the Cost of Capital

Unlike most properties on the market where there is a wide spread between the bid and ask prices, rent-stabilized properties can be acquired for cap rates in the range of 7.5%-8.5%, or below the cost of capital. Sure, current laws limit ownership’s ability to add any meaningful value through major capital improvements or apartment renovations but that also means no out-of-pocket capital expenditures will be incurred. Like an investment in a business development company or covered call ETF, you can expect limited appreciation but a consistent and healthy yield.  At a cap rate in the 8% range with borrowing costs where they are today, these properties can be acquired at an undemanding valuation for investors to jump in. 

Future Interest Rates

Owners and operators found out the hard way what Warren Buffet knew all along and that is “everything in valuation gets back to interest rates” and commercial real estate is no exception. The oft-quoted metaphor is that Interest rates are to asset prices what gravity is to an apple. However, if interest rates have peaked or will soon, investors can expect more favorable financing and valuations in the years ahead.

Over the next five to seven years, investors may be able to re-finance at a rate well below current market rates. Furthermore, if asset prices drop with higher interest rates, the inverse is also true. That is, if we move to a 5% interest rate world, it stands to reason that the appropriate cap rate for rent-stabilized buildings could be in the 5.5%-6% range.

To illustrate, imagine an investor buys a 15-unit rent-stabilized building with a $220,000 net operating income at an 8% cap rate in 2023, or $2.75 million. Five years later, assume the net operating income didn’t change (i.e., the rent roll increased nominally as did expenses), but the appropriate cap rate is 6%. The value of the asset increases to $3.67 million with no improvement in the rent roll or net income.

Predictable Income Stream with Long-Term Tenancy

When a tenant receives a favorable regulated rent, they tend to pay on time and stay for a lengthy period of time. Rent stabilized rents are typically nothing to write home about but the arrears and vacancy loss is very manageable making the revenue and income very predictable. Peace of mind has its benefits.

Future Legislative Changes

Hoping that the HSPTA goes away or its impact is substantially diluted by chipping away at the law may be wishful thinking. But there are a few things legislators in Albany would be wise to re-think as we approach the five-year mark since the passing of HSTPA. Any landlord-friendly amendments to the HSPTA law, could result in a surge in the value of rent-stabilized buildings.

The HSTPA is widely perceived as an unmitigated disaster and not just by landlords. Tenants sit in unrenovated units and receive only the bare minimum required of landlords. There are an estimated 40,000-90,000 rent-stabilized units that remain vacant as owners would rather warehouse the units than rent them out for the paltry legal rent they can achieve. For context, there are approximately 88,000 homeless people in NYC, of whom 31,500 are children. Regardless of your politics, this is a failure in policy with heart-wrenching implications.

Final Thoughts

Should you run out and buy as many rent-stabilized properties as you can find? Probably not as not all rent-stabilized buildings are created equally. When performing your due diligence, a few things to be mindful of include (i) the current taxes (is the asset in a protected tax class 2A/2B), (ii) any serious violations and penalties, (iii) the arrears report, (iv) whether any preferential rents exist and perhaps most importantly, (v) the delta between the legal rents in place and market rate. The last point matters as there can be value creation in vacating the property which is more challenging to accomplish when rents are well below market rate.

For those who remain unconvinced, there are risk free federal money market funds yielding 5.25% and for the more adventurous out there, consider the over/under that interest rates decline substantially in the next few years along with inflation and the folks that occupy the Senate and Assembly in Albany come to their senses even if just a bit. 

Website Sources:
Long, C. (2023, April 10). NYC Commercial Real Estate Sales Fell By Over 50% To Start The Year. Bisnow. https://www.bisnow.com/new-york/news/capital-markets/uncertainty-slowed-q1-investment-sales-but-distress-is-only-just-starting-118456

Hall, M. (2023, October 5). “The Worst Market I’ve Seen”: NYC Commercial Real Estate Sales On Pace For Worst Year Since 2009. Bisnow. https://www.bisnow.com/new-york/news/capital-markets/new-york-investment-sales-is-down-65-on-last-year-120975

Basic Facts About Homelessness: New York City - Coalition For The Homeless. (2023, November 8). Coalition for the Homeless. https://www.coalitionforthehomeless.org/basic-facts-about-homelessness-new-york-city/#:~:text=In%20September%202023%2C%20there%20were,each%20night%20in%20September%202023.
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The WeWork Project Comes to an End

Every story must ultimately come to an end and this one finishes on Chapter 11.  WeWork—the beleaguered co-working space company—filed for bankruptcy in early November after struggling to pay back its debt. This can happen when you own assets worth $15 billion but carry debt obligations of $19 billion. The fall was truly spectacular in economic terms as WeWork’s value fell from $47 billion at its peak to a mere $45 million just before filing for bankruptcy.

The Reasons for WeWork’s Downfall

What explains the mighty downfall? A few things it turns out: first, the company masqueraded as a tech startup but, once disrobed, was revealed to be little more than a “run-of-the-mill” office-space provider to short term renters. Its business model revolved around rental arbitrage whereby the company entered into long term leases with landlords at fixed rents, improved the space, and sub-let it to short term tenants at a premium above the fixed rate. Unfortunately, WeWork entered into long-term leases at the height of the market in the late 2010s only to see the market for office space decline soon thereafter and then fall off a cliff when the pandemic hit in March 2020. It turns out arbitrage only works if you can re-rent space for more than what you are paying.

IPO Attempt in 2019 Reveals Trouble

A failed IPO attempt in 2019 revealed all was not well at WeWork. The filings revealed larger-than-expected losses and potential conflicts of interest with the co-founder and then-CEO Adam Neumann. Neumann was booted the same year but only after negotiating a golden parachute in excess of $1 billion. 

One brilliant concession Neumann negotiated as a condition of his departure was a $430 million loan from Softbank, an early and major backer of WeWork, that did not need to be paid back. Instead, Softbank reserved the right to seize Neumann’s WeWork shares held as collateral if he failed to pay back the loan (the shares, worth $500 million at the time of the concession, were worth $4 million at the time of the bankruptcy filing). Think Neumann will be paying back the loan? Me neither, but don’t hate the player, hate the game.

Even after going public at a much reduced valuation of $9 billion, WeWork never truly found its footing. Competitors entered the space as the model was easily replicated and the work-from-home phenomenon turned out to be more permanent than transitory. Add higher interest rates and macroeconomic uncertainty and WeWork’s failure was a foregone conclusion.

Bankruptcy Doesn’t Mean Game Over

The “automatic stay” is a fundamental feature of the bankruptcy process and it offers immediate and powerful protections to debtors like WeWork. For example, most collection efforts, lawsuits and foreclosure actions initiated by creditors are immediately halted giving WeWork time to reorganize its finances and live to see another day. This leaves many of the landlords who have long term leases with WeWork in an unfortunate predicament as WeWork can, subject to certain requirements, cherry pick those leases it wishes to hold onto (the well performing ones) and assign or cancel the underperforming leases. In fact, WeWork said it would begin to renegotiate many of its leases and with hundreds of locations in the US and Canada comprising nearly 20 million sq. ft. of office space, there is much work to be done.

Who Loses in the WeWork Bankruptcy

WeWork will likely emerge from bankruptcy a leaner, more efficient, and scaled down version of itself presumably with the best performing locations intact. Unfortunately, there will be many losers from the fallout, including equity investors, hundreds of landlords, and debtholders. Adam Neumann, however, won’t be one of them. Neumann recently commented that the WeWork bankruptcy filing was “disappointing” and “challenging” for him to watch blaming the company for “failing to take advantage” of its potential. In the end, Adam Neumann may have failed in his stated mission of “elevating the world’s consciousness,” but he managed to make a small fortune at WeWork mostly by starting with a large one. 

Website Sources:
Holman, J., & Moreno, J. E. (2023, November 7). WeWork files for bankruptcy amid glut of empty offices. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/06/business/wework-bankruptcy.html 

Brown, E. (2023, November 11). WSJ News Exclusive | A possible winner from WeWork’s troubles? Adam Neumann. The Wall Street Journal. https://www.wsj.com/real-estate/commercial/a-possible-winner-from-weworks-troubles-adam-neumann-0144d018 

Gladstone, A., Saeedy, A., & Putzier, K. (2023, November 8). WeWork, once valued at $47 billion, files for bankruptcy. The Wall Street Journal. https://www.wsj.com/articles/wework-files-for-bankruptcy-5cd362b5 

Plotko, G., & Higgins, M. (2023, September 17). WeWork’s potential bankruptcy raises issues for landlords and member-tenants. New York Law Journal. https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2023/09/17/weworks-potential-bankruptcy-raises-issues-for-landlords-and-member-tenants/?slreturn=20231010192823 
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